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unavoidably have con￿ icting e⁄ects: they increase the likelihood of welfare improving
investments and at the same time they increase the likelihood of (welfare reducing) op-
portunistic behavior. Thus opportunism reduces the value of contracting by limiting
the e⁄ectiveness of contractual incentives. We provide conditions for the optimality of
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11 Introduction
The modern theory of the ￿rm (Williamson, 1985; Hart, 1995) takes incomplete contracts
as a departing assumption. Ownership structure and organizational design arise as a
response to the imperfection of such contractual arrangements. Yet our understanding of
what makes the use of contracts undesirable is still imperfect.1
This paper develops and formalizes the idea that contracting can be costly when trading
partners engage in opportunistic behavior to circumvent the original purpose of a contract.
For example, a contracting partner may ￿nd a loophole in the contractual terms that allows
him to ful￿l the contractual obligations, but not in the way that was intended when the
contract was signed. The problem can also arise when a court cannot verify the ful￿lment
of contractual obligations, for instance when it cannot precisely say whether a widget to be
exchanged satis￿es the requirements laid out in the contract. We show that when trading
partners can exploit veri￿ability problems, a contract that tries to encourage e¢ ciency-
enhancing investments can lead to costly opportunism instead.
Examples of opportunistic behavior abound. In the classical example of General Motors
and Fisher Body, the two parties signed a contract whereby GM agreed to buy closed metal
automobile bodies exclusively from Fisher, at a price equal to its variable costs plus a ￿xed
markup of 17.6% to cover the ￿xed costs of production. Klein (1992) argues that Fisher
exploited this contractual agreement by ￿adopting an ine¢ cient, highly labor-intensive
technology and by refusing to locate its body-producing plants adjacent to the General
Motors assembly plant.￿Changing the production technology in such a way, can be viewed
as a costly way of exploiting the above contract, in order to extract rents from the agreed
1Indeed, several authors have argued that contracts can often solve the hold-up problem, which has been
the main focus of the theories of the ￿rm (Moore and Repullo, 1988; Maskin and Tirole, 1999). Moreover,
even though such mechanisms can be very complex, it is often possible to have simple, more realistic
contracts that achieve the same goal in speci￿c environments (Aghion et al., 2002; Edlin and Reichelstein,
1996; and N￿ldeke and Schmidt, 1995, are some examples).
2￿xed markup.
Contracts between suppliers of petroleum coke (i.e. oil re￿neries) and their buyers (e.g.
calcining ￿rms) provide another example of how (potential) opportunistic behavior can
in￿ uence contractual design. Petroleum coke contracts are typically long-term to protect
the re￿neries￿investments (see Goldberg and Erickson, 1987). Rather than specifying a
￿xed price (or a schedule of future prices) many contracts include a ￿ exible price-adjustment
clause which links the price to an index (beyond the control of the parties). Goldberg and
Erickson (1987) wonder why seemingly ine¢ cient price-adjustment clauses are used.2 They
suggest (without formalizing this idea) that risk-neutral ￿rms include price-adjustment
rules as they give less incentives for opportunistic behavior. Parties who enter a contract
have incentives to spend resources on gathering information about future prices which
diminishes the pie. As Goldberg and Erickson note, this wasteful search can be reduced by
lowering the value of information, which is done by price-adjustment rules. Furthermore,
when the contract price di⁄ers from the market price, there is an incentive for the losing
party to try to avoid the implementation of the agreement.3 Price adjustment clauses,
by decreasing the gap between contract and market prices, can mitigate these ex-post
incentives to behave opportunistically.4
To model opportunism and its e⁄ects on contracting, we consider a buyer and a seller
that would like to exchange a widget in the future. The seller can make an investment that
2In their paper, they ask: "Given that price-adjustment can be di¢ cult and costly, why bother?"
3According to Goldberg and Erickson, the implementation of the agreement can be avoided either by
directly su⁄ering the legal and reputational consequences of not ful￿lling the contract, or by insisting on
strict compliance with quality standards, by performing at a slower pace, or by "working to the rules."
4Incentive schemes in agency relationships are also exploited. There is evidence of earnings manipulation
and strategic timing of sales to reach particular performance targets (Oyer, 1998). And these practices can
be costly for the ￿rm (Courty and Marschke, 2004). Firms also adjust their incentive schemes to minimize
opportunistic behavior, even at the cost of sacri￿cing incentives for e¢ cient actions. Martinez-Jerez (2007),
for instance, argues that Charles Schwab pays its ￿nancial advisors the same commission for selling all
￿nancial products, despite their own products carrying higher margins. This is done to prevent overselling
particular products at the expense of the interest of the customers, which can be seen as yet another form
of opportunism.
3increases the total value of the trade. However, she may also make a costly opportunistic
investment that does not increase the welfare of the transaction. While the parties under-
stand the nature of the trade, a court cannot verify the nature of the investment that has
been undertaken. We further assume that the parties are free to renegotiate any agreement
to eliminate any ex-post ine¢ ciencies. Under these conditions, we show that any contract
that creates incentives for welfare-increasing investments will inevitably create incentives
for socially undesired opportunistic activities as well. The optimal contract trades o⁄higher
e¢ ciency enhancing investments against the risk of opportunistic activities.5 As a result,
the ￿rst best cannot generally be attained. Furthermore, when opportunism becomes very
likely, the value of contracting can be very small. Indeed, it can be optimal for the parties
to leave the contract incomplete, and rely on ex-post negotiations.
Our model provides a formalization of the informal arguments made in the transaction
costs literature. Klein (1992) argues that the appropriate framework for studying contract-
ing among ￿rms is one where transacting parties observe each other￿ s actions. He further
claims that opportunistic behavior is contractually unavoidable, and is indeed exacerbated
by a contract.6 Yet when trading partners are symmetrically informed about each other￿ s
actions, it is not obvious that opportunism cannot be overcome using elaborate contracts,
in a similar way that the mechanism design literature resolves the hold-up problem.7 This
paper provides a formal proof of Klein￿ s statements. We show how opportunism condi-
5The trade-o⁄s that arise in the model are similar to those emphasized by Klein (1992). Ex-ante, parties
evaluate the likelihood of su⁄ering opportunism, and write a contract accordingly. If this probability is
su¢ ciently small (as Klein argues was the case in the GM and Fisher Body example), the parties would
write a contract to maximize incentives, and neglect opportunism. But ex-post, the realization of the state of
nature may be such that opportunism is su¢ ciently rewarding, that the parties withhold pro￿table trading
opportunities. On the other hand, when the parties foresee opportunism to be a more likely possibility, the
contracts adjust accordingly to curb opportunism, as in the petroleum coke case.
6Note that this is di⁄erent from Williamson (1985), who in contrast argues that the existence of in-
complete contracts creates incentives for opportunism in order to appropriate the rents that have not been
allocated contractually.
7See Moore and Repullo (1988) and Maskin and Tirole (1999).
4tions the form of optimal contracts, and what trade-o⁄s are involved when designing them.
Moreover, we show that opportunism induces parties to sign a more incomplete contract
than they would have in the absence of such activities.
The paper also makes a technical contribution to the mechanism design literature.
Other papers have shown that general mechanisms may o⁄er little value when such con-
tracts must implement an ex-post e¢ cient outcome.8 This is the case in complex environ-
ments (Segal, 1999, Hart and Moore, 1999), in situations where a contract cannot enforce
trade unless it provides both parties with at least the payo⁄ they can receive in renego-
tiations with no-trade as disagreement point (Hart and Moore 1988) or when e¢ ciency-
enhancing investments are cooperative or ambivalent (Che and Hausch, 1999; and Reiche,
2006).9 In all these models the seller is restricted to one-dimensional investments, whereas
we allow for di⁄erent types of investments. This multidimensionality allows us to capture
the idea that a contracting partner can either invest in the relationship, or in rent-seeking.
This feature introduces incentive compatibility constraints that link the two investments.
As a result, a contract that is designed to increase socially desirable investments at the
same time also encourages opportunistic investment.10 The model also highlights the im-
portance of the di¢ culty to contract on the nature of the good to be traded and, unlike
8As in these papers, we model ex-post renegotiations as a cooperative game. For the implications of
alternative assumptions on ex-post renegotiation, see Maskin and Tirole (1999), Hart and Moore (1999),
Aghion et al. (1994) and Evans (2008).
9Another fruitful branch of the literature argues that contractual incompleteness is a response to cog-
nitive limitations or behavioral biases of contracting partners (Bolton and Faure-Grimaud, 2007; Hart and
Moore, 2008; Tirole, 2008; von Thadden and Zhao, 2007). Our approach, in contrast, focuses on veri-
￿ability problems, thus stressing the importance of the cognitive limitations of the contract enforcer for
understanding incomplete contracts.
10Our model is reminiscent of Holmstrom and Milgrom￿ s (1991) multitasking model, and its recent ap-
plications to gaming of incentive schemes (see Ederer, Holden and Meyer, 2008). Nevertheless, there are
substantial di⁄erences. First, unlike agency models, there is symmetric information in our framework.
This opens up the possibility of a richer set of contracts that cannot be used to solve agency problems.
Furthermore, the interaction between the two types of investments comes from an endogenous incentive
compatibility constraint in our case, whereas the interaction between activities arises from the cost of e⁄ort
(a technological link) in the multitasking model. Finally, in our model there is only one task that can create
value, whereas in the multitasking model, the principal would like the agent to exert e⁄ort in multiple tasks.
5earlier models, shows how this can make the widgets available for trade endogenous.11
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents in a very simple
example the main intuition of the paper. Section 3 presents the setup of the model. As
a benchmark, we solve for the ￿rst best and no contract cases in Section 4. We derive
the main results of the paper in Section 5. We discuss some extensions in Section 6, and
Section 7 concludes. The formal derivations and proofs are presented in Appendices A and
B.
2 An Illustrative Example
A simple example can illustrate how the potential for opportunism can alter the value of
contracting. Consider a buyer (he) that would like to purchase a widget from a seller (she),
and denote this widget by R. The widget costs cR for the seller to produce and o⁄ers value
vR to the buyer. To get e¢ ciency in this transaction, it is enough to rely on an e¢ cient
negotiation between buyer and seller to agree on a spot contract.
Consider what happens if the seller can make a speci￿c investment prior to the produc-
tion of the widget to improve the value of the transaction. In particular, suppose that the
seller can pay a cost of ￿I to create (invent) a new improved widget (I) with a production
cost of cI < cR ￿ ￿I and a value of vI = vR.12 Suppose, also, that ine¢ cient outcomes
resulting from a contract are renegotiated to an e¢ cient outcome, and that the buyer has
11In Che and Hausch (1999) and Reiche (2006) the e⁄ectiveness of a contract is limited by the trade-o⁄
between the bene￿ts of an investment (increase of the value of trade) and its disadvantage (increase in
bargaining position of the opponent). Instead, in our framework a contract that is designed to increase
socially desirable investments at the same time also encourages opportunistic investments. The incomplete
contract may then be optimal, not because it maximizes investment, but because it minimizes the cost of
opportunistic investments. Furthermore, to make this point we do not require existence of a large number
of trading opportunities, as in Segal (1999) or Hart and Moore (1999). Moreover, the widgets available for
trade are exogenous in their setups, while they are endogenous in ours.
12This improved widget could be thought of as an adaptation that is tailored to the speci￿c needs of the
buyer, as in Ellman (2008). Notice that the increase in welfare comes from a reduction in the production
cost. Che and Hausch (1999) refer to this type of investments as sel￿sh.
6all the bargaining power. Now, a simple spot contract is not enough to induce the seller
to invest in creating the new trading opportunity, since the buyer captures all the rents
generated by the investment. This is the classic hold-up problem. However, the e¢ cient
investment can still be achieved through a contract. For example, consider a contract that
speci￿es that the buyer must pay a price of p 2 [cR;vR], and the seller is allowed to produce
either widget. Since this contract ￿xes the price for the seller, she will receive all the gains
from cost reduction, and hence, will invest e¢ ciently.
This last contract, however, can potentially perform very badly. Suppose that the seller,
by investing ￿O, can create yet a third widget (O) which is useless to the buyer, but is cheap
to produce (cO < cI), and a third party cannot distinguish it from I.13 O would never
be traded in a spot transaction. Nevertheless, the seller can use this widget to pretend
she has an improved one, which she would be entitled to deliver to the buyer, obtaining
a payo⁄ of p ￿ cO. The buyer would then ask to renegotiate the contract, demanding the
R widget be delivered. Since he has all the bargaining power, he will extract all the gains
from trade that have not been allocated by the contract, leaving the seller with the same
payo⁄ of p ￿ cO. As long as ￿O < ￿I, she will prefer to create this opportunistic widget
and pretend it is the improved one. This creates an e¢ ciency loss for two reasons. First,
because the improved widget is not created. Second, because the seller pays the cost of
creating O, despite this never being traded. We can therefore think of this investment as
the cost of being opportunistic, in the spirit of the transaction costs literature. It can be
seen as a metaphor for behavior that is aimed at extracting rents, rather than enhancing
the value of the relationship. The seller pays for it, despite being ine¢ cient, in order to
increase her share of the rents.
13Note the di⁄erence between the cost of creation (￿I or ￿O) and the cost of production (cI or cO). The
cost of production is only incurred when the widget is actually traded. The cost of creation, in contrast,
can be thought of as the cost of developing a prototype, sample or blueprint of the product which then can
be shown to the buyer and/or a third party.
7This example shows that contracts that seem to implement e¢ cient outcomes in a
robust manner, may indeed be quite fragile when parties can a⁄ect future contingencies in
a way that is not foreseen ex-ante. It is still unclear, however, how much of this ine¢ ciency
can be overcome if the parties anticipate the possibility of opportunistic behavior, and
design a contract to prevent ine¢ cient rent-seeking.
Suppose that the parties realize that the seller can either invest in the creation of an
improved trading opportunity I, or an opportunistic one O, used for the sole purpose of
obtaining rents from the contract. Suppose also that the seller can create at most one
new widget.14 In general, a contract can condition on parties￿announcements about the
nature of the widget created, and we can restrict attention to contracts that induce truthful
announcements. In Section 5.2 we show that for this example any outcome arising from
such a contract can also be implemented with a contract of the following form: the seller
gets a price pR if there is only one widget, and pN if there are two.15 In the latter case,
the buyer can choose which widget to purchase. For any such contract, when ￿O < ￿I,
either no new widget is created (if pN ￿ pR < ￿O), or O is created (if pN ￿ pR ￿ ￿O).
In particular, we cannot provide the seller with incentives to create the improved widget,
and it is optimal to leave the contract incomplete, and let the parties negotiate ex-post.
This way, the improved widget is not created, as the seller has no bargaining power, but
the opportunistic behavior is avoided. If, on the other hand, ￿O > ￿I we can obtain even
￿rst-best incentives to invest by setting pN = ￿I ￿ pR. As in this setup both widgets are
substitutes from the viewpoint of the seller and the improved widget is cheaper to create,
no contract encourages the creation of the opportunistic widget.
In the remainder of the paper we relax the assumptions that investment costs are de-
terministic, and bargaining power is concentrated in the buyer. This yields the general
14Creating both,I and O; may be excessively costly or impossible for technical reasons.
15See the proof of Proposition 2.
8insight that providing incentives for welfare-enhancing investments also encourage oppor-
tunistic investments. As a consequence any contract has to trade o⁄ these adverse e⁄ects.
We analyze this trade-o⁄ and characterize conditions under which the incomplete contract
is optimal and conditions under which the ￿rst best can be obtained.
3 The Model
We consider a trading relationship between two risk-neutral parties: a buyer, B, and a
seller, S, who want to exchange one unit of a widget in the future. Initially, there is a
known widget, which we call R (regular), that could be traded. This widget has a value of
vR to the buyer and it costs the seller cR to produce.
However, before trade occurs, the seller can make an investment at a cost of ￿I to
create a new widget with superior quality and/or lower production costs. If she decides
to make the investment the seller can produce and trade the widget, which we call I (for
improved). When this happens, we assume that it is still possible to trade the original R
widget, so two trading opportunities exist. The improved widget has a value of vI, and
production costs of cI with vI ￿ cI > vR ￿ cR.
For our model to re￿ ect the idea that I cannot be perfectly described in any contract
and consequently that there is no guarantee that I is indeed created, we assume that the
seller can also decide to make an investment at a cost ￿O to create another widget O (for
opportunistic widget): If the seller decides to make this investment, she can produce and
trade widget O. And the contract cannot distinguish between I and O, i.e. the identities of
O and I are not veri￿able. Therefore, the seller can deliver O to claim the rents allocated
to the buyer by the contract for the creation of I. We interpret the investment in the
creation of O as an opportunistic investment in rent-seeking: there is no social bene￿t in
having O (as we will assume shortly), but the seller may still obtain private gains from it.
9Implicit in our formulation is the assumption that even when the parties may have a
good idea of what the I widget could look like, or what it might achieve, they cannot
perfectly describe this in a way that rules out that a di⁄erent inferior widget is created
as a substitute. Buyer and seller cannot foresee at the time of writing the contract how
potential contractual formulations could be circumvented: what element of the description
of I is not accurate, or what performance measure can be deceived, and in what way.
Otherwise they could describe I in a veri￿able way. Nevertheless, they understand that
these contractual imperfections may occur and be exploited by the seller, and they can
foresee what the payo⁄ implications would be.
Accordingly, we assume that this opportunistic widget O has a value of vO, and produc-
tion costs of cO and that it is inferior to the existing one R, i.e. we assume vR￿cR > vO￿cO.
Furthermore, the widget O entails low production costs for the seller: cO < cR and
cO < cI.16
The cost vector (￿I;￿O) is revealed to the seller before making the investment decisions
and cannot be observed by the buyer or a third party. It is the realization of a random
variable which can take values in [0;1]
2 and has a commonly known distribution given by
the cdf F and density function f.
We assume that only one widget is needed. Since vI ￿ cI > vR ￿ cR > vO ￿ cO, the
ex-post e¢ cient trade is the improved widget if available, and the R widget otherwise.
The creation and trade of the opportunistic widget is always socially undesirable. We also
assume that the seller cannot create both the I and O widgets simultaneously. We discuss
16The assumption that vO and cO are known ex-ante (and thus can be foreseen by both parties) is not
critical. We could assume that vO and cO are realizations of random variables that become known after the
contract is written. As long as for any realization of vO and cO we have that vR ￿ cR > vO ￿ cO, cO < cR
and cO < cI the relevant constraint on implementability does not depend on the precise values of vO and
cO: Even a contract that conditions on both parties￿announcements of the values of vO and cO would not
help to relax the relevant constraint. This is because, for any value of vO and cO; trade of O is imposed
neither on the equilibrium path nor o⁄ the equilibrium path for the relevant disagreement (see section 5.1
and the Appendix A).
10the importance of this assumption in Section 6.2.
The outcome of the investments is common knowledge between buyer and seller.17 Yet,
a third party can only observe that a new trading opportunity exists, but cannot verify
whether it is I or O. We also assume that it is possible to describe the R widget ex-ante, so
that ex-post, a third party can verify its identity. However, since the I and O widgets have
not been created, they cannot be described in advance, and hence, a third party cannot
tell them apart ex-post.18
The timing is as follows: at time t = 0, the two parties can write a contract which
speci￿es the terms of trade. At time t = 1 the seller observes the costs of creating each
of the widgets, (￿I;￿O), and makes the investment decisions on both the improved and
opportunistic widgets. At time t = 2, buyer and seller observe the widgets they can
trade. Then, an outcome compatible with the contract is imposed on the two parties.
Furthermore we assume that buyer and seller renegotiate to the (ex-post) e¢ cient trade if
this was not already prescribed by the contract (at this point, the seller may decide to show
any widget she hid previously). During the renegotiation, we let the bargaining power of
the seller be ￿ < 1, and that of the buyer be 1 ￿ ￿.19 In particular, if the contract results
in an outcome which gives the seller and the buyer utilities of uS and uB respectively,
after renegotiation the e¢ cient widget is traded and the seller will receive a payo⁄ of
17This assumption is not crucial. In Section 6.1 we argue that the same results hold when the outcome
of the investments is private information of the seller.
18Alternatively, we can also assume that it is not possible to describe the di⁄erences between these yet-
to-be discovered widgets and R, so that the identity of none of the widgets is veri￿able. This could be for
several reasons. R may not have been created at the time the mechanism is designed, but it is known it can
be produced somehow. Alternatively, R may already exist, but it is not possible to describe it accurately.
In order to do so, it would be necessary to know in which ways other widgets can be di⁄erent. Since the
I and O widgets have not been created, it may be impossible to distinguish them from R ex-ante. This
adds an additional dimension that is not veri￿able: the identity of the R widget. However, it turns out
this does not make any di⁄erence to the solution of the implementation problem (see footnotes 20 and 25).
And hence, we do not consider this case for simplicity.
19When ￿ = 1, the seller gets all the rents in a renegotiation. In such a case, the ￿rst best can be easily
achieved with ex-post negotiations, since no contract is necessary to protect her investments.
11uS +￿(vW ￿ cW ￿ (uS + uB)), and the buyer uB +(1 ￿ ￿)(vW ￿ cW ￿ (uS + uB)), where
W = I if the improved widget was created and W = R otherwise.
In general, a contract is a mapping from a message space to the set of possible outcomes.
We can restrict attention to truthful revelation mechanisms, in which a party￿ s message
m describes the (observable) state of the world. There are three possible states: the state
where R is the only widget available for trade, and the two states where either an improved
widget, or an opportunistic widget is available, in addition to the R widget. With some
abuse of notation, we denote these states fR;I;Og.20 Since state R is veri￿able, we can
assume that both parties report mB = mS = R when this state arises. A mechanism only
needs to elicit information about the two states in which there is a new widget. Then, for
each pair of messages (mB;mS), the mechanism can specify a transfer from buyer to seller
p(mB;mS) and a probability of trading each of the widgets (xR (mB;mS);xN (mB;mS)),
such that xR;xN ￿ 0 and xR +xN ￿ 1, where xR corresponds to the R widget, and xN to
the new widget (if available).21 Note that the mechanism speci￿es no trade with positive
probability if xR + xN < 1.
4 Two Benchmarks
This section characterizes the ￿rst best and the outcome in the absence of any contract,
where the parties simply bargain ex-post over the division of the trade surplus. Both will
serve as useful benchmarks.
20If the R widget cannot be distinguished ex-post, the message space has to be expanded to include the
elicitation of the identity of each widget, so that m 2 fR;IR;RI;OR;ROg, where XY denotes the state
where there are two widgets, the ￿rst being X, and the second being Y .
21Implicit in this formulation is the assumption that the mechanism can only prescribe the trade of at
most one widget. This does not restrict generality as a mechanism that can prescribe the trade of both
R and the newly created widget, cannot do better. This is because enforcing the trade of R is a⁄ecting
the buyer and the seller￿ s threat points (in the renegotiations) in the same way, independently of what the
state of the world is (see Appendix A).
124.1 First Best
The ￿rst-best outcome requires the invention and trade of the e¢ cient widget if the social
bene￿ts of I exceed the cost ￿I, i.e. in the ￿rst best I is created if and only if:
￿I ￿ (vI ￿ cI) ￿ (vR ￿ cR):
We assume that creating the improved widget is socially desirable with some positive
probability, i.e. Pr(￿I ￿ (vI ￿ cI) ￿ (vR ￿ cR)) > 0. Notice that the investment in creating
the opportunistic widget generates no value. Therefore, in the ￿rst-best outcome O is never
invented.
This outcome can easily be achieved in an environment where parties can commit not to
renegotiate. For instance, a mechanism that gives the seller full bargaining power by letting
her make a take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er would be able to implement it. Since the seller would
capture all the rents generated by the transaction, she would invest e¢ ciently. Similarly,
in our model with renegotiations, when ￿ = 1, the seller gets all the rents when bargaining
with the buyer, and hence, no contract would be necessary to protect her investment.
4.2 Incomplete Contracts
When buyer and seller do not write a contract, they must bargain ex-post for the terms
of trade. At that stage, the seller is only able to capture a fraction ￿ of the rents. When
either no additional widget is created or the opportunistic widget is created, it is e¢ cient
to trade the R widget, and the seller gets ￿ ￿(vR ￿ cR). If the improved widget is created,
the seller gets a share ￿￿(vI ￿ cI). Hence, without a contract, the seller will not create O,
since she would have to pay ￿O to obtain the same rents she gets without any investment.
13Thus the seller is only willing to invest in creating I if:
￿I ￿ ￿[(vI ￿ cI) ￿ (vR ￿ cR)]:
In particular there is underinvestment in I as compared to the socially optimal investment,
i.e. the ex-ante probability of inventing I is below the socially optimal probability. When
there is no contract governing this relationship, the seller underinvests in the improvement
of the widget, however, he sees no reason to waste resources being opportunistic, since
there is no contract to bene￿t from.
5 Optimal Contracting
In this section, we consider the problem of designing the optimal contract. To simplify
notation, let pR = p(R;R); pI = p(I;I) and pO = p(O;O) denote the prices speci￿ed
by the mechanism when buyer and seller agree on the state of the world. When parties
can renegotiate any previous agreement, we can restrict attention to truthful revelation
mechanisms that implement the e¢ cient trade when both parties truthfully report the
state of the world. On the equilibrium path, the seller will get a pro￿t of
US =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
pI ￿ cI ￿ ￿I if seller invents I
pO ￿ cR ￿ ￿O if seller invents O
pR ￿ cR if seller does not invent a new widget.
Notice that the seller invests in I if and only if:
￿I ￿ (pI ￿ cI) ￿ (pR ￿ cR) and ￿I ￿ ￿O + [(pI ￿ cI) ￿ (pO ￿ cR)]:
14The ￿rst inequality states that the seller prefers to invest in I rather than not to invest
at all. The second states that she prefers to invest in I rather than in O. Similarly, she
invests in O if and only if:
￿O < (pO ￿ pR) and ￿O < ￿I ￿ [(pI ￿ cI) ￿ (pO ￿ cR)]:
Let ￿ = (vI ￿ cI)￿(vR ￿ cR) be the social bene￿t of investing in I. Similarly, we denote
the seller￿ s contractual bene￿t from investing in the improved widget by ￿I = (pI ￿ cI) ￿
(pR ￿ cR) and the seller￿ s bene￿t from investing in the opportunistic widget by ￿O = pO￿
pR: The ex-ante probability of creating I is thus given by Pr(￿I ￿ ￿I ￿ max(0;￿O ￿ ￿O)),
the ex-ante probability of creating O is Pr(￿O < ￿O ￿ max(￿I ￿ ￿I;0)). We thus inter-
pret ￿I and ￿O as the incentives to invest in the improved or opportunistic widgets,
respectively: the larger ￿I (￿O) the higher the ex-ante probability that the I (O) widget
is created.22
The welfare W generated by a contract that induces truthtelling about the state of the
world is given by:
W = (vR ￿ cR) +
Z
￿I￿￿I￿max(0;￿O￿￿O)
(￿ ￿ ￿I) ￿ dF ￿
Z
￿O<￿O￿max(￿I￿￿I;0)
￿O ￿ dF: (1)
In order to increase the (ex-ante) probability of inventing the improved widget, more
incentives to invest in I should be provided. This requires setting a high price pI, relative
to the price pR, to increase ￿I. In contrast, in order to deter the ine¢ cient investment in
the opportunistic widget, the mechanism should lower the price pO relative to pR, so that
￿O is low. As we will see in the next section, the fact that the outcome of the investment
is not veri￿able by a third party constrains the set of prices pR; pI; pO that can support
22Note that an increase in ￿I does not necessarily lead to a strictly higher probability that I is created,
as Pr(￿I ￿ ￿I) might be constant over some range (￿
￿
I;￿
￿￿
I ), ￿
￿
I < ￿
￿￿
I .
15truthtelling. In particular, not all combinations of ￿I and ￿O are feasible. We say that
a contract is optimal if it maximizes welfare among the set of all possible contracts that
support truthtelling in an incentive compatible way. The next subsection derives these
incentive compatibility constraints, which are used in Subsection 5.2 to characterize the
optimal contract.
5.1 Resolving Disagreements
This subsection provides an informal discussion of the constraints truthtelling imposes on
the implementation problem. The formal derivations can be found in Appendix A.23
Notice that whenever one party deviates unilaterally from truthtelling, there is a dis-
agreement between the buyer￿ s and seller￿ s reports. To assure that in equilibrium both
agents report the true identities of available widgets, the mechanism needs to be able to
punish any possible (one-sided) deviation. In order to achieve this, the designer has two in-
struments. She can set transfer prices and/or enforce the exchange of widgets in a way that
punishes the deviator.24 There are two possible disagreements: either (mB;mS) = (I;O)
or (mB;mS) = (O;I).25 In both, buyer and seller disagree on the type of widget that has
been created. Consequently, buyer and seller also disagree on the e¢ cient action: in the
￿rst, the buyer claims they should trade R, while the seller wants to trade the new widget;
in the second, the opposite is true.
23General conditions for implementation when agents can renegotiate (and cannot commit not to rene-
gotiate) are derived in Maskin and Moore (1999).
24Note that any payments that the designer imposes on one party will have to go to the other, since
ex-post renegotiations would prevent any waste.
25If the identity of the R widget cannot be veri￿ed ex-post, the message game is complicated by the
fact that there may be two widgets to be traded: R plus either I or O. The mechanism then must elicit
the identity of each of the widgets. As a result, there are potentially more disagreements. Nevertheless,
most disagreements are easily resolved. There is only one disagreement which is binding, corresponding to
the announcement (mB;mS) = (OR;IR). In this disagreement, buyer and seller agree on the identity of
the R widget, and hence, it is irrelevant whether the identity of this widget can be veri￿ed (in the worst
disagreement, they indeed agree on which is the R widget). Notice that this disagreement is analogous to
the second one described in the main text.
16The ￿rst disagreement, (I;O), can arise for two reasons: either the true state is I, and
the seller is lying, or the state is O and the buyer is lying. Notice that in both cases, the
liar is making a claim against his own interests: the buyer claiming the new widget being
better than it actually is, or the seller claiming it is worse. A simple way of avoiding this
disagreement is to increase the equilibrium payo⁄ for the seller in the I state, and for the
buyer in the O state. But this amounts to increasing pI and decreasing pO, which goes in
the direction of what the implementation problem would require to achieve the ￿rst best.
As a result, this disagreement can be easily resolved, without imposing restrictions on the
set of outcomes that can be implemented.
The second disagreement, however, is harder to resolve, and imposes restrictions on the
implementation problem. As before, there are only two ways to arrive at this disagreement.
Either the buyer lies when the state is I, or the seller lies when the state is O. Now, however,
each of the parties is distorting the truth in their own interest: either the buyer is trying
to make the new widget look worse than it is, or the seller is exaggerating its quality.
We show in Appendix A that enforcing the exchange of a widget (either R or the new
one) cannot discourage misreporting. Hence, lying can only be prevented by specifying no
trade after such a disagreement and appropriately setting payments p(O;I); pI and pO.
In particular the buyer￿ s payo⁄ from truthtelling when the true state is I (in which case
the contract speci￿es trade of the improved widget at price pI) must be (weakly) larger
than his payo⁄ if he reports O. In such a case, the contract speci￿es that he pays p(O;I)
and no widget is traded. But the subsequent renegotiation would give him a share (1 ￿ ￿)
of total bene￿ts from trading the improved widget. Thus truthtelling requires that:
vI ￿ pI ￿ ￿p(O;I) + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (vI ￿ cI):
Similarly, to prevent the seller from reporting I when the true state is O; we must have
17that:
pO ￿ cR ￿ p(O;I) + ￿ ￿ (vR ￿ cR):
The price p(O;I) is also a limited instrument to induce truthtelling. Increasing p(O;I)
relaxes the buyer￿ s constraint, making it more costly for him to lie, but at the expense of
making the seller more willing to lie. Since both constraints must be satis￿ed, the only
way to relax them simultaneously is by increasing vI ￿ pI or pO ￿ cR. The ￿rst means
a decrease in pI, and hence, the seller￿ s payo⁄ in case she creates the improved widget.
Alternatively, the second means an increase in pO, and hence, the seller￿ s payo⁄ if she
invents the opportunistic widget. The intuition is straightforward: in order to induce
truthtelling, the mechanism needs to give rents to the buyer to admit when the seller made
the right investment (lowering the payo⁄of the seller), and for the seller to admit when she
engaged in rent-seeking (increasing her payo⁄ from doing it). Both of these alternatives go
against the direction needed for e¢ ciency.
Adding these two inequalities and rearranging terms, we obtain a constraint in terms
of the social and contractual incentives: ￿I ￿ ￿O + ￿￿. This constraint says that the
contractual bene￿t the seller obtains from creating the improved widget cannot be larger
than her contractual bene￿t from creating the opportunistic widget plus ￿￿, the seller￿ s
bene￿t from creating I in the absence of any contract. Therefore, whenever ￿O = 0, so the
seller has no incentive to create O, the best the contract can achieve is the implementation
of the incomplete contract outcome. Furthermore, in order to increase the incentives to
invest in the improved widget beyond what the incomplete contract can obtain, we must
increase ￿O above zero, which usually induces some incentives to invest in O (i.e. it induces
incentives for rent-seeking).
Any optimal contract minimizes the amount of investment in creating O, for a given ￿I.
18Therefore, there is always an optimal contract for which the constraint will be binding.26
In what follows we focus attention on optimal contracts and, therefore, restrict attention
to contracts with:
￿I = ￿O + ￿￿: (2)
In Appendix A, we show that this condition is su¢ cient for implementability. To simplify
notation, we describe a contract by the incentives it provides to invest in the opportunistic
widget, ￿O. It should be clear, however, that there are many ways to choose the set of
prices and trades (p(mB;mS);x1 (mB;mS);x2 (mB;mS)) that generate the same incent-
ives. And, therefore, ￿O does not uniquely identify a contract, but a set of contracts that
implement the same outcome.
5.2 Opportunism as a Constraint on Contracting
As discussed above, the incentive compatibility constraint (2) imposes a relation between
the incentives to create the improved and the opportunistic widgets. Increasing the in-
centives to invest in the improved widget can only be encouraged if, at the same time,
incentives for the opportunistic widget go up as well, potentially resulting in ine¢ cient
rent-seeking. In general, the optimal mechanism will trade-o⁄ a lower investment in the
creation of I with a lower investment in the creation of O, and thus the ￿rst best can-
not typically be obtained. An exception occurs when the invention of the opportunistic
widget is particularly costly. In this case, increasing ￿O does not induce any ine¢ cient
investment, and incentive compatibility does not impose strong constraints on the imple-
mentation problem. As a result, we may be able to provide ￿rst-best incentives. To state
this formally, let e ￿ := minfxj Pr(￿I ￿ x) = Pr(￿I ￿ ￿)g be the lowest level of incentives
26Note that if the distribution of (￿I;￿O) has full support, then any optimal contract will necessarily
satisfy ￿I = ￿O + ￿￿.
19to invest in I that results in ￿rst-best investment in I. The following proposition makes
the earlier intuition precise.
Proposition 1 The ￿rst best can be implemented if and only if:
Pr
￿
￿O ￿ min
￿
e ￿ ￿ ￿￿;￿I ￿ ￿￿
￿￿
= 1:
If there exist " > 0 such that for all (￿I;￿O) 2 [￿ ￿ ";￿ + "] ￿ [￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ";￿ ￿ ￿￿] we
have f (￿I;￿O) > 0 then the ex-ante probability of inventing the improved widget under the
optimal mechanism is lower than in the ￿rst best.
In order to get the ￿rst best, we must have ￿I = e ￿, so that the contractual bene￿ts of
the seller equal the social bene￿t. However, this implies that ￿O = e ￿￿￿￿, but the seller
must not invest in creating O. This can only happen when the return from an investment in
O never exceeds the cost ￿O or when investing in I is more pro￿table than investing in O: In
particular, the ￿rst best can be achieved if either the cost of invention of the opportunistic
widget always exceeds its bene￿ts (￿O ￿ ￿O = (1 ￿ ￿)￿ with probability 1) or if the
gains from inventing I always exceed the gains from creating O (￿O ￿￿O ￿ ￿I ￿￿I with
probability 1). Nevertheless, in most cases, the ￿rst best cannot be achieved.
The next proposition shows that in many environments a simple option contract can
implement the second-best outcome.
Proposition 2 Suppose that ￿￿(vI ￿ vR) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿(cR ￿ cI). Then, the second best can
be implemented with the following contract: the seller sells at a price pR if no new widget is
created, and at a price pN otherwise; in the latter case, the buyer has the option to choose
either the new (shown) widget or the already-known widget R.
Note that ￿ ￿ (vI ￿ vR) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (cR ￿ cI) is always ful￿lled for sel￿sh investments,
i.e. if we have that vI ￿ vR (which implies cI ￿ cR): Then the buyer will not pick the
20improved widget when available. Consequently, the seller obtains pN ￿ cR, plus a share of
the increase in total welfare ￿￿ in the renegotiation stage. Since the buyer would never
choose to buy O, the most the seller can get from creating it is pN ￿ cR. Therefore,
the above contract satis￿es ￿I = ￿O + ￿￿, and hence, the second-best outcome can be
implemented by choosing pR and pN appropriately. Incidentally, this contract is optimal
because it provides incentives for creating I, while minimizing the rents that the seller gets
from inventing the opportunistic widget. Instead, if the seller chooses what to supply,27
she would o⁄er O for trade at a price pN when available. And she would further get
additional rents of ￿[(vR ￿ cR) ￿ (vO ￿ cO)] from renegotiating to the e¢ cient trade of
R. The second-best contract eliminates these additional bene￿ts from creating O, thereby
minimizing incentives for its creation.
If investments are cooperative (i.e. if vI > vR); an option contract will make the buyer
choose the improved widget (rather than R) as long as his bargaining power is su¢ ciently
small. But this means that the seller￿ s additional payo⁄from inventing I is not aligned with
the e⁄ect of such an innovation on total welfare ￿: Consequently, a contract that results
in di⁄erent prices, depending on whether the I or O widget was invented, can outperform
a simple option contract.
This proposition also makes clear the contracting trade-o⁄. In general, the optimal
contract gives incentives to invest in both, O and I; and thus results in socially undesirable
opportunism. In particular, when the conditions of the proposition are satis￿ed, a single
price pO is charged, irrespective of the nature of the widget created. Hence, it is clear that
positive incentives for e¢ cient investments can only be created at the expense of ine¢ cient
opportunistic behavior. In the following we explore conditions that diminish the value of
contracting.
27This is one of the contracts that we considered in Section 2.
21Proposition 3 Let ￿￿
O be the optimal contract when the distribution of costs has density
f. Consider a function ￿(￿I;￿O), with f (￿I;￿O) +￿(￿I;￿O) ￿ 0 and which satis￿es one
of the following two conditions:
1. there exists b ￿O (￿I) ￿ ￿I ￿ ￿￿ such that ￿(￿I;￿O) ￿ 0 for all ￿O > b ￿O (￿I), and
￿(￿I;￿O) ￿ 0 for all ￿O ￿ b ￿O (￿I); furthermore,
R ￿O
0 ￿(￿I;￿O) ￿ d￿O = 0 for all ￿I
2. there exists b ￿I (￿O) ￿ ￿O + ￿￿ such that ￿(￿I;￿O) ￿ 0 for all ￿I > b ￿I (￿O), and
￿(￿I;￿O) ￿ 0 for all ￿I ￿ b ￿I (￿O); furthermore,
R ￿I
0 ￿(￿I;￿O) ￿ d￿I = 0 for all ￿O
Then, the optimal contract when the costs have density f (￿I;￿O) + ￿(￿I;￿O), b ￿￿
O,
satis￿es b ￿￿
O ￿ ￿￿
O.
The previous result shows that if low costs for creating O become more likely, the
optimal contract will provide fewer incentives. This is because for the social planner a
given level of incentives ￿O is more costly if ￿O is more likely to be low. Then the
probability that the seller behaves opportunistically by creating O instead of I is higher.
Similarly, if high costs for creating I become more likely, providing incentives becomes less
pro￿table. A given level of ￿O will induce a smaller e¢ cient investment, and hence the
optimal contract will provide lower incentives.
This result has a simple interpretation. When quality is di¢ cult to describe, making
it easier for the seller to deceive the buyer, the contract should optimally lower the price
paid for performance. Conversely, when performance becomes more costly for the seller, it
becomes more likely that she will want to behave opportunistically instead, and therefore,
the contract should also optimally reduce the payment for compliance.
In the following, we address the question of whether the trade-o⁄ between inducing
more incentives to invent I and reducing the incentives to invest in O can diminish the
22value of contracting to zero. The trading partners would then prefer to have an incomplete
contract, and rely on e¢ cient negotiations after investment has taken place.
The incomplete contract is optimal whenever ￿O = 0 is the maximizer of (1). Intuit-
ively, when ￿I = ￿￿; incentives to innovate in the improved widget are below the socially
optimal level. Thus, the incomplete contract can only be optimal if any increase of ￿I
beyond ￿￿ comes at such a high cost of adjusting ￿O that this increase does not improve
total welfare. The next result gives a su¢ cient condition for this to be true when the
distributions of ￿I and ￿O are independent. Let f (￿I;￿O) = fI (￿I) ￿ fO (￿O) and denote
by rI and rO the hazard rates of fI and fO, respectively. Then, the following result holds:
Proposition 4 Suppose that the costs ￿I and ￿O are independent, and their hazard rates
rI and rO satisfy [(1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ k] ￿ rI (k + ￿￿) ￿ k ￿ rO (k) for all k 2 [0;(1 ￿ ￿)￿]. Then,
the incomplete contract is optimal.
A marginal increase in ￿O increases the likelihood of creating the improved widget by
[1 ￿ FO (￿I ￿ ￿￿)] ￿ fI (￿I), generating a bene￿t of (￿ ￿ ￿I). At the same time, this also
increases the probability of creating O by [1 ￿ FI (￿O + ￿￿)] ￿ fO (￿O), resulting in a cost
of ￿O. For the incomplete contract to be optimal, the costs must outweigh the bene￿ts.
And the condition in the proposition guarantees this to be the case.
Notice that the marginal cost of increasing incentives beyond the incomplete contract is
zero, whereas the marginal bene￿t (￿￿￿I) is strictly positive. As a result, the probability
of having a cost ￿I around ￿￿ must be arbitrarily small, and it is only allowed to rise
gradually, as the cost ￿O increases, and the bene￿t ￿ ￿ ￿I decreases.
236 Extensions
6.1 Seller￿ s Disclosure of Information to the Buyer
Throughout this paper we have assumed that both buyer and seller observe the investment
undertaken by the latter. This simpli￿es the exposition of the results. And since symmetric
observability by the two parties is always assumed in this literature, it facilitates the
comparison of our result with previous work. Nevertheless, it is useful to point out that
the results do not hinge on this assumption. In this section, we show that the results remain
unaltered under asymmetric observability. In particular, we assume, as would seem natural,
that the outcome of the investments is private information of the seller. Nevertheless, once
the seller shows a new widget to the buyer, he immediately observes whether it is I or O.
The timing of events remains the same as before, with the exception that at t = 2,
only the seller observes the widgets they can trade, and decides which widgets to show as
available for trade. In particular the seller can decide not to show the buyer a widget that
has been created. Thus, the message spaces for buyer and seller are di⁄erent. While the
buyer can still report mB 2 fR;I;Og; the seller can announce mS 2 fR;RI;RO;I;Og;
where RI and RO refer to the states where a new widget (I in the former, O in the latter
case) has been created but not shown to the buyer. I and O refer to states where a new
widget has been created and shown. We will show here that we can still implement all
outcomes that could be achieved in the case where created widgets are observable by both,
buyer and seller. We do so in two steps. We ￿rst show that the seller cannot bene￿t from
hiding a widget and then admitting in the implementation of the mechanism that she did
so. And then we show that the seller cannot bene￿t either by hiding a widget until the
renegotiation stage.
Whenever we have that the seller reports state RI or RO; the contract can require her
24to show the new widget to the buyer, and ask again the buyer and the seller about the
state of the world. If the seller fails to show a new widget because she lied and has not
invented one, she can be punished with a su¢ ciently large payment to the buyer.28 Thus,
by reporting RI or RO; she cannot improve upon revealing the information to the buyer,
and then reporting either I or O.
Finally, it remains to show that the seller will not create a widget and hide to increase
her position in the renegotiations. First note that the opportunistic widget is always
shown to the buyer if the seller has created it. If she hides it initially, she can show it at
the renegotiation stage, but then, this widget has no value. Therefore, if the seller intends
to hide it, she would prefer not to create it in the ￿rst place. Furthermore, the seller always
shows the improved widget to the buyer if ￿￿ ￿ ￿I: Creating I but hiding it from the
buyer will give the seller an additional payo⁄of ￿￿ as compared to the state where only R
exists. But creating I and showing it to the buyer will result in an additional payo⁄ of ￿I.
The condition ￿￿ ￿ ￿I does not restrict the implementation problem, since an optimal
contract gives at least the same incentives to invest in I as the incomplete contract.
This argument shows that the seller never has an incentive to hide from the seller a
widget that has been created. Clearly, we will still have the binding constraint (2), as
we need truthful reporting of states I and O, if the seller reveals all the information to
the buyer: As a result, the model where the seller￿ s investments are private information
is analogous to the model with symmetric information between buyer and seller. All the
results in the previous section would carry through unchanged.
28By a similar argument we can assume that both, buyer and seller agree on the number of widgets
shown. If they disagreed, the liar can easily be detected by asking the party who reported a new widget to
show its existence, and punished, by making him/her pay the other party.
256.2 Contracting When There Are Multiple Widgets
Throughout this paper, we have assumed that the seller can only create one new widget.
This is a convenient assumption that simpli￿es our analysis. And we want to consider now
the generality of our conclusions when this is relaxed.
As discussed in the main text, the optimal mechanism must satisfy ￿O = ￿I ￿ ￿￿.
This constraint, in turn, discourages the seller from trying to invent both O and I at the
same time, and hide one before playing the mechanisms. Suppose the seller created both
widgets. Then she could hide O and show only I to the buyer. They would, therefore,
agree to trade I at a price pI, as the mechanism states. In this case, O would be useless,
and the seller would rather avoid the cost of inventing. Instead, the seller could hide I and
show only O. They would then agree to trade R at a price pO. And later, the seller could
show I to the buyer and ask for a renegotiation, capturing the rents ￿￿. Doing this, the
seller obtains a payo⁄ of pO ￿ cR + ￿￿ ￿ ￿I ￿ ￿O. But this is dominated by the invention
of I alone, which would yield a payo⁄ of pI ￿ cI ￿ ￿I = pO ￿ cR + ￿￿ ￿ ￿I, where the
equality follows from the truthtelling constraint.
A ￿nal possibility is that the seller shows both I and O to the buyer before playing the
mechanism. In such a case, the mechanism should also specify what happens in this state
of the world. Nevertheless, since the seller can hide O, she can guarantee herself the payo⁄
from the I state, and hence could never be punished for creating both widgets. Still, the
mechanism could o⁄er more to the seller, to encourage the creation of both I and O. To see
the usefulness of such a strategy, consider the initial example. We showed that whenever
￿O < ￿I, no contract can induce the creation of the improved widget, since the seller would
always prefer to create O, instead. Nevertheless, if the contract speci￿ed a high payo⁄ to
the seller for inventing both, it could achieve this objective. Notice, however, that the
main message of the paper still applies: in order to give incentives for e¢ cient investments,
26the contract cannot avoid giving incentives to behave opportunistically. Furthermore, the
incomplete contract may still be optimal, since as long as ￿O > ￿ ￿ ￿I, creating both
widgets is still less desirable than having no investment.
There is yet another reason to be sceptical about the use of contracts that reward the
creation of both I and O. Just like we argued at the beginning that contracts that reward
the creation of I may su⁄er from investments in O, rewarding the creation of both I and
O may lead, instead, to the creation of multiple opportunistic widgets.29 Therefore, when
two new widgets are available, we may still have to elicit whether there is an improved
widget among them, resulting in further truthtelling constraints. To avoid having to make
the same argument multiple times, it is then natural to consider a model where multiple
widget creation is either not possible, or not encouraged by the contract.
7 Conclusion
This paper introduces a cost of contracting that originates from the possibility that a
contracting party may behave opportunistically and search for and exploit a loophole in
the contractual formulations. The possibility of such opportunistic behavior is anticipated
and can be observed by the parties, but it cannot be veri￿ed. Then typically no contract,
not even one that is contingent upon parties￿reports on whether opportunism occurred, can
provide ￿rst-best incentives for relationship-speci￿c investments when it is assumed that
parties renegotiate any ine¢ cient contractual outcome. To be more precise, it is shown that
whenever a contract provides incentives to foster investments to increase the value of the
relationship, these same incentives also encourage opportunistic behavior which devalues
29It seems reasonable to assume that whenever a loophole in the contract has been discovered, the seller
can exploit it in multiple ways. This can be modelled by allowing the seller to produce numerous small
variations of O which could be used whenever a contract requires the seller to show a certain number of
widgets.
27the relationship. The optimal contract has to take these opposite e⁄ects into consideration;
in general, it is optimal to provide below ￿rst-best incentives. If opportunistic behavior
is relatively inexpensive (as compared to the welfare enhancing investment) the value of
contracting may become low, or even zero.
The model is not only useful for understanding the barriers to contracting. It can
also be used to motivate the assumption of incomplete contracts which is common in the
theories of the ￿rm. We demonstrate that assuming non-veri￿ability of the state of the
world can be enough to justify the assumption of incomplete contracts even if contracts can
potentially be complex. To obtain this result, we only have to assume that post-contractual
opportunistic behavior is possible, and that ine¢ cient outcomes are renegotiated.
Our model, given its simplicity, can also serve as a framework for addressing further
important contracting questions. The model can be extended to incorporate assets, in or-
der to address the problem of optimal ownership structure. Since the model encompasses
incomplete contracts as a special case, it can be used to extend the property rights theory
of the ￿rm, by incorporating opportunism and more general contracting possibilities than
commonly assumed. It can also be used to understand how opportunism a⁄ects the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of long-term as opposed to short-term contracts. This can o⁄er
new insights to explain the optimal length of contracts. These and other considerations
are left for future research.
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8 Appendix A
In this appendix we derive the implementability constraint (2). Prices p(mB;mS) and
probabilities of trade (xR (mB;mS);xN (mB;mS)) have to be speci￿ed such that truth-
31telling occurs in a Nash equilibrium. Necessary and su¢ cient conditions for this are given
in Theorem 0 in Segal (1999).
Assume ￿rst that mB = I and mS = O: Applying Theorem 0 in Segal (1999), im-
plementability requires that there exists p(I;O) and (x1 (I;O);x2 (I;O)) such that the
following two constraints are ful￿lled for the seller and the buyer respectively
pI ￿ cI ￿ p(I;O) ￿ xR (I;O)cR ￿ xN (I;O)cI
+￿[(vI ￿ cI) ￿ xR (I;O)(vR ￿ cR) ￿ xN (I;O)(vI ￿ cI)];
vR ￿ pO ￿ ￿p(I;O) + xR (I;O)vR + xN (I;O)vO
+(1 ￿ ￿)[(vR ￿ cR) ￿ xR (I;O)(vR ￿ cR) ￿ xN (I;O)(vO ￿ cO)]:
Adding these constraints gives:
pI ￿ pO ￿ xN (I;O)((1 ￿ ￿)(cO ￿ cI) + ￿(vO ￿ vI)) + (1 ￿ ￿)(cI ￿ cR) + ￿(vI ￿ vR):
As cO < cI and vO < vI; the constraint is least binding for xN (I;O) = 1 and we have
that the two constraints can be ful￿lled if:
pI ￿ pO ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(cO ￿ cR) + ￿(vO ￿ vR)
or
pO ￿ cR ￿ pI ￿ cO ￿ ￿[(vO ￿ cO) ￿ (vR ￿ cR)]:
Consider now the case where mB = O and mS = I: Applying Theorem 0 in Segal
(1999), implementability requires that there exists p(O;I) and (xR (O;I);xN (O;I)) such
32that the following two constraints are ful￿lled for the seller and the buyer respectively:
pO ￿ cR ￿ p(O;I) ￿ xR (O;I)cR ￿ xN (O;I)cO
+￿[(vR ￿ cR) ￿ xR (O;I)(vR ￿ cR) ￿ xN (O;I)(vO ￿ cO)];
vI ￿ pI ￿ ￿p(O;I) + xR (O;I)vR + xN (O;I)vI
+(1 ￿ ￿)[(vI ￿ cI) ￿ xR (O;I)(vR ￿ cR) ￿ xN (O;I)(vI ￿ cI)]:
Adding these constraints gives:
pO ￿ pI ￿ xN (I;O)((1 ￿ ￿)(cI ￿ cO) + ￿(vI ￿ vO)) + (1 ￿ ￿)(cR ￿ cI) + ￿(vR ￿ vI):
As cO < cI and vO < vI the constraint is least binding for x2 (I;O) = 0 and we have that:
pO ￿ pI ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(cR ￿ cI) + ￿(vR ￿ vI)
or
pO ￿ cR ￿ pI ￿ cI ￿ ￿[(vI ￿ cI) ￿ (vR ￿ cR)]:
Furthermore, the calculations show that if we have that for some (pO;pI) the condition:
pI ￿ cO ￿ ￿[(vO ￿ cO) ￿ (vR ￿ cR)] ￿ pO ￿ cR ￿ pI ￿ cI ￿ ￿[(vI ￿ cI) ￿ (vR ￿ cR)] (3)
is ful￿lled, then we can ￿nd a contract (p(mB;mS); x1 (mB;mS);x2 (mB;mS)) for which
p(I;I) = pI and p(O;O) = pO that is implementable. In this sense, (3) is su¢ cient and
necessary for implementability.
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Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose that Pr
￿
￿O ￿ min
￿
e ￿ ￿ ￿￿;￿I ￿ ￿￿
￿￿
= 1, and
set ￿I = e ￿, and ￿O = e ￿ ￿ ￿￿. Clearly, ￿I and ￿O satisfy the truthtelling constraint.
Moreover, as Pr
￿
￿O < min
￿
e ￿ ￿ ￿￿;￿I ￿ ￿￿
￿￿
= 0, we cannot have that ￿O < ￿O and
￿O < ￿I + ￿O ￿ ￿I simultaneously, and hence O is never invented. Furthermore, the I
widget is invented whenever ￿I ￿ ￿. To see this, notice that ￿I ￿ ￿ implies that ￿I ￿ e ￿,
since Pr
￿
￿I 2
h
e ￿;￿
i￿
= 0. But this means that ￿I ￿ ￿I, and hence the seller is willing
to invent it. Also, ￿O ￿ min
￿
e ￿ ￿ ￿￿;￿I ￿ ￿￿
￿
= ￿I ￿ ￿￿ = ￿I + ￿O ￿ ￿I, and hence
the seller prefers to invent I, rather than O. Therefore, I is indeed created for any ￿I ￿ ￿.
To show the other direction, suppose now that there exists a mechanism that imple-
ments the ￿rst best. We can characterize it by ￿O, since it must satisfy the truthtelling con-
straint, and hence, we can set ￿I ￿ ￿O+￿￿. Moreover, the mechanism should not provide
incentives to invest in innovating O: This implies that investing in innovation of O is unprof-
itable or less pro￿table than investing in I, i.e. Pr(￿O ￿ min(￿O;￿I + ￿O ￿ ￿I)) = 1.
Furthermore, it should induce an innovation in I whenever ￿I ￿ ￿. Since we have that
Pr
￿
￿I 2
h
e ￿ ￿ "; e ￿
i￿
> 0 for any " > 0, we must have ￿I ￿ e ￿, or ￿O ￿ e ￿ ￿ ￿￿. There-
fore, Pr
￿
￿O ￿ min
￿
e ￿ ￿ ￿￿;￿I ￿ ￿￿
￿￿
￿ Pr(￿O ￿ min(￿O;￿I + ￿O ￿ ￿I)) = 1.
Assume now that f (￿I;￿O) > 0 for all (￿I;￿O) 2 [￿￿";￿+"]￿ [￿￿￿￿￿";￿￿￿￿]:
Clearly, a contract cannot be optimal if it induces a higher probability of inventing I than
in the ￿rst best. Welfare, given a contract ￿O ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿; is:
W (￿O) =
Z ￿￿+￿O
0
Z 1
max(0;￿I￿￿￿)
(￿ ￿ ￿I) ￿ f (￿I;￿O) ￿ d￿O ￿ d￿I
￿
Z ￿O
0
Z 1
￿￿+￿O
￿O ￿ f (￿I;￿O) ￿ d￿I ￿ d￿O
34and therefore:
@W
@￿O
=
Z 1
￿O
(￿ ￿ ￿O ￿ ￿￿) ￿ f (￿O + ￿￿;￿O) ￿ d￿O ￿
Z 1
￿O+￿￿
￿O ￿ f (￿I;￿O) ￿ d￿I
and
@W
@￿O
￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿O=￿￿￿￿
= ￿
Z 1
￿
(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿￿) ￿ f (￿I;￿ ￿ ￿￿) ￿ d￿I:
and we have that in the optimal contract ￿O < (1 ￿ ￿)￿: This implies that ￿I < ￿.
Proof of Proposition 2.
We need to show that for any possible value of ￿O; we can construct a contract of this
form such that ￿I = ￿O+￿￿: Assume ￿rst that there was no innovation. Then they must
trade the R widget at a price of pR. If the seller created a widget, she will always show
it, as explained in Section 5.1. Suppose the seller creates O and shows it. The buyer will
choose R since vR ￿ pN ￿ vO ￿ pN + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ [(vR ￿ cR) ￿ (vO ￿ cO)] is always satis￿ed.
When the seller creates I, the buyer will also choose R whenever vI ￿pN ￿ vR ￿pN +(1￿
￿)[(vI ￿ cI) ￿ (vR ￿ cR)], which is satis￿ed if and only if ￿￿(vI ￿ vR) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿(cR ￿ cI).
Hence, when the seller creates O her payo⁄ is pN ￿ cR and when she creates I her payo⁄
is pN ￿cR +￿￿, since the buyer chooses R in either case. Thus, in an equivalent truthful
revelation mechanism we have that pO = pN (recall that pO ￿ cR is the seller￿ s payo⁄ in
the revelation mechanism when O is created) and that pI = pN ￿cR +￿￿+cI (recall that
pI ￿cI is the seller￿ s payo⁄ in the revelation mechanism when I is created). In particular,
we have that ￿I = ￿O +￿￿. This shows that for any second-best contract given by prices
(pR;pI;pO) setting pN = pO implements the second-best outcome as well.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let b f (￿I;￿O) = f (￿I;￿O) + ￿ ￿ ￿(￿I;￿O). Then, it
su¢ ces to show that welfare is submodular in (￿O;￿) under either of the conditions of the
35proposition. Di⁄erentiating the welfare function we obtain:
@W
@￿O
= [(1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ ￿O] ￿
Z 1
￿O
b f (￿O + ￿￿;￿O) ￿ d￿O ￿ ￿O ￿
Z 1
￿O+￿￿
b f (￿I;￿O) ￿ d￿I
If we further di⁄erentiate with respect to ￿, we obtain:
@2W
@￿@￿O
= [(1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ ￿O] ￿
Z 1
￿O
￿(￿O + ￿￿;￿O) ￿ d￿O ￿ ￿O ￿
Z 1
￿O+￿￿
￿(￿I;￿O) ￿ d￿I
Under condition 1,
R 1
￿O ￿(￿O + ￿￿;￿O) ￿ 0 since ￿(￿O + ￿￿;￿O) > 0 for ￿O < ￿O and
integrates to zero in the full range. Furthermore, ￿(￿I;￿O) ￿ 0 for all ￿I ￿ ￿O + ￿￿.
Hence, @2W
@￿@￿O ￿ 0, and welfare is submodular in (￿O;￿). A similar argument yields the
same result under condition 2.
Proof of Proposition 4.
Denote by W (￿O) the welfare that results from ￿O (and ￿I = ￿O + ￿￿). For the
incomplete contract to be optimal, it must be the case that W (￿O) ￿ W (0) for all ￿O > 0.
When costs are independent, we can write:
W (￿O) ￿ W (0)
=
Z ￿O+￿￿
￿￿
Z 1
￿I￿￿￿
(￿ ￿ ￿I) ￿ f (￿I;￿O) ￿ d￿O ￿ d￿I ￿
￿
Z ￿O
0
Z 1
￿O+￿￿
￿O ￿ f (￿I;￿O) ￿ d￿I ￿ d￿O
=
Z ￿O+￿￿
￿￿
(￿ ￿ ￿I) ￿ [1 ￿ FO (￿I ￿ ￿￿)] ￿ fI (￿I) ￿ d￿I ￿
￿
Z ￿O
0
￿O ￿ [1 ￿ FI (￿O + ￿￿)] ￿ fO (￿O) ￿ d￿O
=
Z ￿O
0
f((1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ [1 ￿ FO (￿)] ￿ fI (￿ + ￿￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ [1 ￿ FI (￿ + ￿￿)] ￿ fO (￿)g ￿ d￿;
36where the last step follows from the change of variables ￿ = ￿I ￿ ￿￿ and ￿ = ￿O. The
assumption that [(1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ k] ￿ rI (k + ￿￿) ￿ k ￿ rO (k) implies that the integrand is
non-positive. As a result, the last integral cannot be positive for any ￿O 2 [0;(1 ￿ ￿)￿],
and hence, the incomplete contract is optimal.
37